Elections still can be fixed, even if voting machines can't

When I cast my vote, does the machine record it properly? And how would I know? That’s a great question. Then there's also the question of whether electronic receipts would expose who voted for whom.

There has been no lack of controversy over electronic voting machines in recent years. What started out as a technological progression of convenience in casting and counting ballots has turned out to be a giant argument of security, anonymity and the old saying, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”

Just the other day El Paso County Judge Anthony Cobos put an item on the regular agenda to propose purchasing electronic voting machines that produce a receipt after a ballot is cast. Seems pretty simple, right? Not really.

I’m sure you remember as well as I do the controversy that has surrounded our foray into electronic voting, but do you know the history? Let’s review.

The first thing you need to know is that in the voting machine industry the touch screen type of ballot casting system you use is referred to as a Direct Recording Electronic voting system, or a “DRE” if you want to sound cool the next time you run into an elections department head. If you trust the government they’ll tell you that way back in 1996 a whopping 7.7 percent of Americans cast their ballot on a DRE voting machine

The machines at that time were approved sparingly by state governments. Remember, the Constitution provides for the states to conduct elections, which means they are responsible for setting the rules. That all changed in 2002. Why?

The infamous “hanging chads” of the 2000 election convinced Congress to pass the Help America Vote Act of 2002. While the act did not require every precinct in the nation to use DRE voting systems, it pretty much made it the most viable option for states to comply with the new standards. The government even made money available to municipalities to make the switch all that much easier. Wikipedia has pretty decent rundown of the requirements put forth in the act. [link

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The presidential election in 2004 was the first major test of the new machines. One of the major manufacturers of DRE voting systems was Diebold, Inc. Their CEO, Walden O'Dell, announced in August of 2003 that he was a fundraiser for then-President George W. Bush. Needless to say a storm of controversy has since surrounded not just Diebold-produced machines, but all DRE voting machines. Shortly thereafter charges of being able to hack the DRE machines with MacGyver-like skills and tools surged through the media, convincing almost everyone who had lost their election that they had been cheated.

Using the simplest historical high points, that’s how we find ourselves here. Feel free to rage about your personal experiences with DRE machines or the vast right wing conspiracy in the comments section below. However, do know that I didn’t steal your vote, invent the machines or ask the State of Texas to approve them. But go ahead and call me an asshole if it makes you feel better.

We now find ourselves with a question of how to authenticate our election results so that we know the winner is really the winner.

We could go back to optical scan sheets or paper ballots. They leave the often sought “paper trail” people are so sure will keep all elections secure. The initial problem with both options is the possibility of someone casting an “over vote.” An over vote occurs when a voter marks more than one candidate for a particular office. This results in the vote being thrown out given that it cannot be determined what the voter’s intent was. This was the exact problem they faced in 2000 in Florida. You can’t over vote on a DRE machine – it simply won’t let you.

The DRE machine prevents the events of Florida from recurring, but it doesn’t make any of us feel better about what happens when we electronically cast our vote. When I cast my vote, does the machine record it properly? And how would I know?

That’s a great question. A question you should have also been asking about your old paper ballots as well.

There’s no guarantee that when you take your paper ballot and put it in the ballot box as you leave that it will be counted later that night at all. Voter fraud using paper ballots is historically the most common way of stealing an election by the sheer amount of time the system has been around. Let me explain how simply this can be done.

All one needs to do to compromise a paper ballot system is to have anyone in the process of transporting the ballot box or handling the ballots on the take. Paper ballots are only counted to make sure they match up with the number of voters on that precinct’s register. At any point a new batch of ballots that have been pre-marked and of the same count can be substituted. You have no way of knowing if this happens. There is zero chance for you to verify that your vote was accurately cast. You can only check the voter rolls after the election to see if they have you marked as having voted in the last election. Nobody knows but you how you voted. If you think they got your vote wrong, what proof do you have of it? None, zero, nada – when you drop that ballot in that box you are as helpless in the process as when you cast your ballot on a DRE machine. You have no real “paper trail” with paper ballots. Your “I Voted” sticker doesn’t count, either.

Ah, but where does one get a paper ballot? They must be impossible to replicate and are under strict lock and key at all times, right? Nope. I used to have stacks of the different kinds of ballots from all around the country in my office in Washington, D.C. I simply called up the FEC and state elections offices and asked them for samples because I spent my days on the road working on getting people registered to vote and trained on how to use a voting machine. They were always more than happy to help.

I had provisional ballots, ex-pat ballots, absentee ballots, optical scan ballots and regular paper ballots. The only difference was that the optical scan and paper ballots didn’t have the printed progressive numbers below the perforated edge. A quick trip to any print shop or a person with a good number stamp could knock out thousands of valid-looking paper ballots in a day. Besides, they are quite easy to replicate. We’re not exactly talking about the new $20 bill here, are we?

Going back to the paper ballots would also mean we spent a lot of money on DRE machines we can’t use anymore. So what is a county government to do?

Well, maybe they could buy new DRE machines that print out a receipt of your vote. This doesn’t solve the problem of abandoning a bunch of expensive DRE machines, but it does appear to leave a “paper trail.” Are there any drawbacks to this perfect solution? Yes.

The folks in Ohio have required that the machines spit out a receipt of a cast ballot and have run into a very disturbing problem – people can see who voted for whom!

If you’re too lazy to click the link, I’ll explain. When a person casts their vote the computer must keep a record of it, obviously. When giving you a receipt it must mark that receipt in some manner that allows someone to go back and verify the ticket against the computer. A “time stamp” is the most common method of validating the receipt. Obviously the elections department retains a copy of the receipts on their system because it is what tallies the votes. All anyone has to do is get that tally and compare the time stamp to the registrar’s book. They match up the time people came in and the vote cast at that time and they know exactly how you voted. So much for a secret ballot, I guess. Anybody who has those two pieces of information has a lot of power.

Critics of the DRE voting machines giving out a receipt also point out that the receipts don’t go home with the voter as many assume. They go into a ballot box at the polling place and are considered the official count. Again, there’s no guarantee that the computer didn’t print one thing and tally another. Then there’s the whole problem with the receipts being corrupted, lost or counterfeited. You still have no record of your vote.

Basically what I’m getting to here at the end of this journey is that there isn’t currently a full proof solution on the table. We are left to either accept the imperfect methods in front of us, or keep searching. I guess what I’m saying is that if you aren’t busy, there could be a lucrative market out there for a better ballot casting and counting system.

Any change to be made at the municipal level would have to take a basic principal of change into account. Is the solution that much more secure for the cost? If the solution costs a lot of money and isn’t that much more secure, then we should probably wait until the right system comes along before we make a move.

The only request I have is that when we do find a new system – we vote on it.