A strategy to deter terrorism

Most prominent national security analysts have argued that in countering terrorist threats, deterrent strategies as formulated for conventional warfare have no significant role to play in combating terrorism. A 2002 Rand Corporation study asserts: "The concept of deterrence is both too limiting and too naive to be applicable to the war on terrorism."

Within the coming four years, we have to prepare to pre-empt this holocaust by making meaningful allies and drawing up a strategy. This necessarily means an US, Israel, and India compact. The LeT has delivered in effect that message to the world by brutal murders on 26/11 and thus written the message for us in blood.
In the human body, when the cells start to grow independently of the brain, we say that the body has cancer. Pakistan as a nation thus is suffering from political cancer. After another few, may be four, years this cancer will become terminal.

In four years, I reckon that the Taliban, Mullah, ISI and Army government will unite to form a unified jehadi government. Zardari will then have to return to Dubai and the rest of the prominent members of Pakistani civil society will end up as kafirs in a morgue. Thereafter, India will have nothing left to piously debate about Pakistan on 24/7 TV channels because a jehadi nuclear war will be on the cards. Hence if we do not risk a war with Pakistan at a time of our choosing, we shall have a war anyway of the united jehadi government after four years at the time of their choosing.

Hence, within the coming four years, we have to prepare to pre-empt this holocaust by making meaningful allies and drawing up a strategy. This necessarily means a US, Israel and India compact. The LeT has delivered in effect that message to the world by brutal murders on 26/11 and thus written the message for us in blood.

I do however think our neighbour, and Pakistan's unwavering benefactor, China, has to be kept in the loop, and won over. It can be done because China cannot survive as an economic power without the US. The recent financial crisis has proved that convincingly. Moreover, China has a Islamic fundamentalist problem brewing in Xinjiang, and would be interested in ending it, particularly the infiltration from Kazhakstan and Turkmenistan.

But the core countries of our strategic planning have to be those who have been long identified by Osama bin Laden as the enemies of Islam: US, Israel and India.

Today destiny has bound us together for a common purpose: the extermination of terrorism from the face of the earth by going to its festering source: Islamic fundamentalist theology embedded in the Koran, Sira and Hadith. The hardliners are in control, and their inspiration is Umar of the Caliphate.

All the humane sounding verses quoted by apologists from Koranic texts are really reserved for "believers" i.e., Muslims. For others especially non-kitabis, only brutality, murder and reducing to degrading dhimmi status are prescribed. Let us therefore not be under any illusions. There is therefore no such thing as a "moderate" Muslim. Either one is a Muslim or a renegade equivalent to a kafir. There is no room in Islamic theology for a third alternative believer.

A study by Peter Hammond concludes that where Muslim population in a country is less than 5 per cent, that population does not agitate for a separate law, the Sharia, in fact the community totally integrates itself with the majority in society. He cites the US and Australia as examples. Where the population of Muslims is between 5 per cent and 15 per cent they start agitating on religious grievances and separate identity. He gives India, France and UK as examples. When the population crosses 15 per cent and reaches 40 per cent, then an aggressive struggle by Muslims for autonomy starts. Thus India is at the threshold percentage today. Hammonds analysis corresponds to the classification of countries in Islamic theology: Darul Islam where Muslims rule, Darul Harab where Muslims are not in power but as a minority can agitate by fair or foul, hook or crook, to convert these countries to Darul Islam, and Darul Ahad (or Taqqiya) where a Muslim in minority risk the wrath of the majority, and hence Muslims must be compliant to the wishes of the majority for survival. Islamic theology does not, however as Hammond does, classify nations according to percentage of Muslim population but according to the nature of the majority—whether it is united and aggressive or divided and passive. India is in the latter category, and hence even where Muslims are less than five per cent as in Tamil Nadu, in pockets in the state where Muslims are in majority such as Thondi in Ramanathapuram district or Melvisharam in Vellore district, Muslims have established Darul Islam where Hindus are denied all civic amenities and live defacto as dhimmis. In Kashmir, where statewise they are in a narrow majority, they have engaged in religious cleansing to achieve Darul Islam by driving out half a million Hindus and Sikhs and made them refugees in a 83 per cent Hindu country. Only the Indian army is holding back the establishment of Darul Islam in Kashmir.

I do not blame Islam for this behaviour but find fault with the Hindus for not understanding the nature of Islamic theology even after a 1000 year experience of brutal Islamic rule, or by the betrayal by Ali brothers of Mahatma Gandhi following the foolish Khilafat movement, or the religious cleansing in Kashmir. Globally today, no Muslim nation permits any other religion to be practised even inside one's home, nor permits gender equality as even a goal, or regards democracy as a human value.

No Muslim can be a "moderate" unless he risks becoming a kafir. The experience of Rushdie and Taslima should leave no one in doubt about this. That is why I insist that unless an Indian Muslim proudly acknowledges that his ancestors are Hindus, and hence Hindu civilisation is his or her legacy too, he or she cannot be treated as an equal citizen in India. We need this commitment from the Muslims of India to secure our nation and civilisation from jehadi terror from abroad. According to me, even if half the 83 per cent Hindus unite above caste and linguistic divisions, Muslims will accept this historical truth of being descendents of Hindus. India then can become through the democratic process a virat brihad Hindu nation, where Hindus and Muslims can live securely as blood brothers.

At the same time, let us be clear not to go overboard, as we are prone to do, in forging the US-Israel-India compact against Islamic terrorism. The US interest will always remain to make India into another Australia or Japan, a reliable, pliant, and neutered poodle. But Indian mindset must never waver on the basic goal of a virat brihad Hindutva, and to make India a power of global reach.

Every concession to the US therefore must be negotiated as a return for India's emergence in the global power structure as a pole. India has one asset that the US or Israel does not have, but urgently needs—a huge labour surplus of gifted and intelligent individuals—our demographic dividend now available thanks to the resounding defeat of the Congress in 1977 by the Janata Party and thus putting an end to its horrid nasbandi campaign.

Hence, wherever there exists a "demographic hole" in these two societies, we must offer to fill it. That means readiness to make available our best brains for R&D, and to deploy our army, airforce, and navy in any theatre that they cannot adequately. In return, we must get them to build our infrastructure, modernising our armed forces, and develop our agro-industries with market access.

This bonding is sufficient to make the US-Israel-India compact durable and rewarding for us. Without India the other two cannot fight Islamic terrorism in the most important theatres of the world.

With this compact in place, our virat brihad Hindu identity or Hindutva clearly defined and assimiliated, India can formulate a strategy for deterrence against terrorism that nullifies the political objectives of the patrons of terrorists.

India is today infested with a host of terrorist insurgency. The JKLF, SIMI, ULFA, the PWG, the Maoists, the Tripura TNA, the Naxalites, the Naga terrorists, the Manipur terrorists, etc., etc. They can be crushed quickly except for one factor: The support given to them by Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan's support is via the ISI, a wing of the army, which engages also in fake Indian currency to finance such activities. Pakistani involvement is not because its civil society wants it, but because of the Islamic fervour in the army that is not reconciled to the defeat of its forces in Bangladesh. The same Islamic fervour has turned the Bangladesh establishment against India, and hence with the help of the ISI, AI Qaeda has through it's Indonesian wing established a base to help these terrorists and also to develop the HuJI which is emerging as the human infrastructure of the terrorists in India. Thus, Islam is the heart and Pakistan is the brain of terrorism devil in India. Challenging Islam in the realm of ideas, without diluting the debate with secular platitudes, jamming the brain of terror, and destructing its human infrastructure embedded in Indians the core of a strategy to deter terrorism. This means sanitising Pakistan and truncating Bangladesh is required.

Most prominent national security analysts have argued that in countering terrorist threats, deterrent strategies as formulated for conventional warfare have no significant role to play in combating terrorism. A 2002 Rand Corporation study asserts: "The concept of deterrence is both too limiting and too naive to be applicable to the war on terrorism.1' US President's National Security Strategy document states: "Traditional' concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy".

Of course. I am not concerned here with "traditional concepts" but with new ideas to combat the new form of warfare—clandestine violence under the name of terrorism.

This overwhelming consensus against efficacy of deterrence has now been challenged by two US based scholars, Robert Trager and Desseslava Zagorcheva [in "Deterring Terrorism - It can be Done" International Security Journal (Harvard-MIT publication, Vol.30. No. 3, 2006)]

According to them the case against the use of deterrence strategies in counter-terrorist campaigns appears to rest on three pillars. First, terrorists are thought to be irrational, and therefore unresponsive to the cost-benefit calculation required in successful deterrence. Second, many terrorists are said to be so highly motivated that they are willing to die, and so not deterred by fear of punishment or of anything else. Third, even if terrorists were afraid of punishment, they cannot be deterred because they lack or have a shifting "return address"1 on which retaliation can be visited. Therefore if terrorists' base cannot be found, the use of force against them is useless, eounterterrorist strategies that advocate addressing "root causes", such as by "winning hearts and minds'', economic packages and promoting human rights, are for the long run. The required cure is however for the short run.

Trager and Zagorcheva argue that neverthrelress even the most highly motivated terrorists can be deterred by holding at risk the political goals of their patrons and financier rather than by threatening the life or liberty of the terrorists themselves.

Thus from a policy perspective, my view is that the ability of a terrorist targeted nation to put political goals of the patrons of the terrorists and their benefactors at risk stands the best chance deterring terrorism, and hence is the most important objective of counter-terrorism policy.

The structure of a counter-terrorism policy and the selection of instruments for implementation of this policy has to be targeted nation-specific and terrorist organisation- centric. There cannot be a general global strategy of deterrence against terrorism.

Harvard scholar and Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling, in his Arms and Influence, (pp.70-71), contrasts deterrence (the threat to take hostile action unless the adversary acts).

Traditional view of deterrence in strategic studies literature implies the scope for a bargain: both sides agree to co-operate on a state of affairs that both prefer to alternatives they face. This is called cost-benefit analysis. Deterrence, therefore, is not just about making threats; it is also about making offers. Deterrence by punishment is about finding the right combination of threat and offer.
This war is against Indian culture
By Subramanian Swamy
The Islamic terrorists in India have only one goal: To convert the Dar-ul-Harab India of today into the Dar-ul-Islam of tomorrow. Judging by the secret writings in circulation amongst clerics in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim clerics consider as unacceptable the failure of 800 years of Islamic rule in India to convert India into a 100 per cent Muslim nation, as they did in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt etc.

In 1989, to obtain the release of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's daughter, Rubaiyya who had been kidnapped by terrorists, five terrorists in Indian jails were set free by the VP Singh's government. This made these criminals in the eyes of Kashmiri separatists and fence sitters as heroes, as they had brought India's 'Hindu establishment' on it's knees.
In the case of terrorist menace, because of their ideological and religious beliefs, many terrorists place extreme value on their political objectives relative to other ends (e.g., life and property). For this reason, it appears impossible that a deterrer could hold at risk something of sufficient value to terrorists such that their behavior is affected.

The Islamic terrorists in India have only one goal: To convert the Dar-ul-Harab India of today into the Dar-ul-Islam of tomorrow. Judging by the secret writings in circulation amongst clerics in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim clerics consider as unacceptable the failure of 800 years of Islamic rule in India to convert India into a 100 per cent Muslim nation, as they did in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt etc. Leave alone 100 per cent. Akhand Hindustan could not be converted more than 25 per cent. Thus, it was a passive victory of the Hindus and a blow to the imagined invincibility of Islam.

Hence, Islamic theologists consider the US a meddling nation that is corrupting the social morals of Muslims, Israel to represents a reversal of Islamic conquest of territory in West Asia by Jews who were hated by Prophet Mohammed, and Hindustan a challenge to the invincibility of Islam.

India has a huge population, and worse has begun to develop quickly. Thus India must be targeted by terrorising Hindus and make them to submit. The mad mullahs are thus on a rampage, and we Hindus have to wake up to the real challenge of Mumbai 26/11 and all that preceded it.

Therefore, recognising that targeting of Hindus is the political goal of the Islamic terrorists, while Muslims of India are largely just passive spectators, and that the foreign patrons of Islamic terrorists are beginning to engage in terrorist acts that could put Muslims against Hindus in nation¬wide conflagration and possible civil war as in Serbia and Bosnia, hence the first lesson to be learnt from recent history is that for tackling terrorism India should recognise that the Hindu is the target, and that Muslims of South Asia are being programmed to slide into suicide against Hindus.

The recent of Al Qaeda video tapes in Bihar seeking recruits for terrorism against the ';US-lsrael-India axis" is an indication of this. It is to undermine the Hindu psyche and create fear of civil war that terror attacks are organised. And hence since the Hindu is the target, Hindus must collectively respond as Hindus against the terrorist and not feel individually isolated, or worse be complacent because he or she is not personally affected. If one Hindu dies merely because he or she was a Hindu, then a bit of every Hindu also dies. This is a necessary part of an essential menial attitude of a virat Hindu [for fuller discussion of the concept of virat Hindu, see Hindus Under Siege: The Way Out, Haranand, 2006] required in formulating a deterring strategy against terrorism which is Hindu-centric in it's targets.

Therefore we have to have a collective mindset as Hindus to stand against the terrorist. In this response, Muslims and Christians of India can join the Hindus if they genuinely feel for the Hindus. That they really do so feel, cannot be believed unless they acknowledge with pride that though they may be Muslims or Christians, their ancestors are Hindus. It is not easy for them to acknowledge this ancestry even though that is the truth, because the Muslim Mullah and Christian Missionary would consider it as unacceptable according to the Koran and the Bible.

That realisation of oneness with Hindus would also dilute the religious fervour in their faith and thus create a mental option for their possible re-conversion and return to the Hinduism. Hence, their religious leaders preach hatred and violence against the kafir and the pagan i.e.. the Hindu [for example read Chapter 8 verse 12 of the Koran] to keep the faith of their followers. The Islamic terrorist outfits, e.g., the SIMI being the latest has already resolved that India is Dar-ul-Harab. and they are committed to make it Dar-ul-Islam. That makes them free of any moral compunction whatsoever in dealing with Hindus, including in massacring them.

Bul still, if any Muslim or Christian does so acknowledge his or her Hindu legacy, then we Hindus can accept him or her as a part of the Brihad Hindu Samaj. which constitutes Hindustan. India that is Hindustan is thus a nation of Hindus and those others whose ancestors are Hindus. Even Parsi and Jews in India have Hindu ancestors. This is the true identity of India, known as Hindustan. Others, those who refuse to so acknowledge or those foreigners who become Indian citizens by registration can remain in India, but should not have voting rights [which means they cannot be elected representatives] .

Hence, to begin with, any policy to combat terrorism must first begin with requiring each and every Hindu becoming collectively committed or a virat Hindu. By this it is meant that it is not enough commitment if one individually claims to be Hindu, or goes to temples, does pujas, and celebrates festivals. That is not sufficient to be a committed or virat Hindu. To be a virat Hindu one must have a Hindu mindset.

The second lesson for combating the terrorism that we face today is: since demoralising the Hindu and undermining the Hindu foundation of India in order to destroy the Hindu civilisation, is the goal of terrorists in India we must never capitulate and never concede any demand of the terrorists.

Terrorists are encouraged by appeasement but never satisfied by it. Therefore, no matter how many Hindus have to die for it, the basic policy has to be: never yield to any demand of the terrorists. That necessary resolve has not been shown in our recent history. Instead ever since we conceded Pakistan in 1947 under duress, we have been mostly yielding time and time again.

In 1989, to obtain the release of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's daughter, Rubaiyya who had been kidnapped by terrorists, five terrorists in Indian jails were set free by the VP Singh's government. This made these criminals in the eyes of Kashmiri separatists and fence sitters as heroes, as they had brought India's 'Hindu establishment' on it's knees. To save Rubaiyya it was not necessary to surrender to terrorist demands. There were other ways. But the then government was capitulationists in outlook, or perhaps the then Home Minister was in cahoots with the terrorists.

The third lesson to be learnt is that whatever and however small the terrorist incident, the nation must retaliate—nor by measured and"sober" responses but by massive retaliation. For example, when Ayodhya Temple was sought to be attacked, or the Institute of Science in Bangalore was targeted, these were not big terrorist incidents but we should have massively retaliated. Our Intelligence agencies keep telling us that we have clinching proof of terrorist training camps in PoK and Bangladesh, and if that is so, we should bomb them by despatching our airforce. There is some evidence that the US agency, the FBI has presented to a district court in California satellite photos that establish that five terror training camps exist near Balakot in northeast Pakistan, Indian government claims proof which has not been made public that there are 57 camps in Pakistani held territory and 36 camps in Bangladesh.

Many are advising the Hindus to deal with the root "cause" of terrorism rather than concentrating on eradicating terrorists by retaliation. And pray what is the root "cause"?

According to bleeding heart liberals, terrorists are born or bred because of illiteracy, poverty, oppression, and discrimination. They argue that instead of eliminating them, the root cause of these four disabilities in society should be removed. Only then terrorism will disappear. Moreover they argue, terrorists cannot be deterred by force since they are irrational, willing to commit suicide, and have no 'return address'.

Searching the backgrounds of some of the world's most notorious Muslim terrorists; we find:
• Bin Laden, the son of a Saudi billionaire, studied engineering.
• His deputy Ayman al-Zawahri is an eye surgeon.
• Mohamed Atta. the son of a lawyer, earned a master's degree in urban planning.
• 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed graduated from an American college with an engineering degree.
• Flight 93 pilot Ziad Jarrah's father is a Beirut bureaucrat who drove a Mercedes and put his son through prep school.
Some of the London bombers had college degrees. One was a school teacher. Another's father owned a store.

Many of the Saudi hijackers were the best and brightest in their towns.

Hani Hanjour who crashed the plane into the Pentagon, studied English at the University of Arizona. Family members were wealthy merchants from Taif, a resort city in Saudi Arabia.

Most Palestinian suicide bombers have come from middle-class homes.

They didn't do what they were expected to do to escape poverty.

And some of the most radical imams in America have doctorates.

Muslim Fundamentalists have an education and an economic future, yet they still terrorise hate. They're literate enough to liberally interpret their holy books, yet they still embrace jihad against kafirs.

The fourth lesson to learn is that more than the activities of the terrorists in India, the more sinister corrosion of our nation state occurs from within. This corrosion provides 'a force multiplier' to the terrorists.

That is, the terrorists are able to leverage the influence of highly placed individuals in the government, media and academia, who have been compromised by the terrorists and blackmailed on sex, drug money and illegitimate favours, into collaborating with them.

One thing is for sure—terrorists in India of all hues and background have their compromised moles in the India's establishment, and hence no anti-terrorist policy can succeed unless these fifth column elements are weeded out. The IB/RAW/MI/CRPF all have files on them and so identifying them is no problem. The political support these traitors have to withdrawn and some have to be made an example of.

It is thus a ridiculous idea that terrorists cannot be deterred because they are irrational, willing to die, and have no 'return address. Our inference here is that terrorist master-minds have political goals and a method in their madness. An effective strategy to deter terrorism is therefore to defeat those political goals and to rubbish them by counter-terrorist action